The voluminous literature comparing public-private partnerships (P3s) and own-investment (OI) by the public sector is dominated by contributions from microeconomic theory. This paper gives macroeconomics a voice in the debate by investigating the repercussions of P3 vs. OI in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring private capital accumulation and involuntary unemployment with efficiency wages. Typically P3s cost more but produce higher-quality infrastructure and boast a better on-time completion record than OI; consequently, they are comparatively more effective in reducing underinvestment in private capital, underinvestment in infrastructure, unemployment and poverty. The asymmetric impact on macro externalities raises the social return in the P3 2 -9 percentage points relative to the social return to OI, depending on whether the externalities operate singly or in combination and on whether P3 enjoys an advantage in speed of construction.
Introduction
Public-private partnerships (P3s) to build and operate infrastructure assets are increasingly common in less-developed countries (LDCs). They are also highly controversial. Microeconomic theory and the evidence accumulated in case studies warn that P3s may be much more expensive than traditional procurement. The list of extra expenses is long and usually starts with the higher cost of private nance. P3s assign construction risk to the private partner to the tight complementarity between asset construction and quality of services. 1 But in a world with incomplete markets, the private sector cannot spread risk as widely as the public sector (Vickrey, 1964; Arrow, 1966; Arrow and Lind, 1970) .
The di erence in the capacity to bear risk raises the return paid to the private partner above the interest rate on government debt. 2 In some LDCs, the return also includes compensation for country risk-for the perception that the government is an "unreliable business partner" (Estache et al., 2015) .
There are numerous other costs to doing business with the private sector. At the procurement stage, the administrative costs of writing and tendering bids for complicated long-term contracts are non-trivial. High bid costs for private rms, in turn, limit ex ante competition (i.e., competition for the market). This, combined with the di culty of designing auctions that prevent collusive behavior (Klemperer, 1999) , limited information on rm costs, the urgent need to resolve infrastructure bottlenecks, and the illusory appeal of P3s as an o -budget operation, make it all too easy for inexperienced governments to overpay the private partner (IMF, 2007) . Moreover, the operations phase is sure to bring additional costs. The complexity of the contracts, the impossibility of enumerating all contingencies in partnerships that last 20 30 years, cumbersome legal systems that impede quick, e cient resolution of disputes, and the strong incentive for opportunistic behavior that arise after each party has made relationship-speci c investments lead inevitably to frequent, costly renegotiations of the original contract. Last but not least, even if the government bargains exceptionally well and minimizes bid, tendering, and renegotiation costs, it cannot avoid the extra expense of monitoring compliance of the private partner; trust without veri cation is inadvisable in P3s and nuclear disarmament agreements. 3 To date no study has compared the total cost of P3s and own investment by the public sector. We know from various fragmentary sources, however, that the extra costs associated with P3s add up to 1 Shortcuts in construction reduce costs but compromise sevice quality. The problem disappears if asset quality is contractible-a condition unlikely to be satis ed.
2 This is distinct from the e ect of di erences in default risk on borrowing costs. Private borrowers pay a premium over the risk-free rate to compensate lenders for the put option. Government borrowing does not involve a put option becuase the cost of failed projects falls on taxpayers.
3 See de Bettignies and Ross (2004) and Valila (2005) for excellent, detailed discussion of these problems.
something substantial.
• Spackman (2002) and HM Treasury (2000) estimate that non-diversi able risk pushes the interest rate on senior debt in P3s 2 3 percentage points above the interest rate on government debt; junior debt and equity nance are presumably even more expensive.
• Measured as a percentage of capital costs, transaction costs average 10% for European governments (Dudkin and Valila, 2005) and 2 10% for private rms in Great Britain (House of Commons, 2002-03) .
• Monitoring costs in U.S. P3s magnify total costs 3 25% (Torres and Pina, 2001 ).
• In Portugal, government o cials acknowledge that a dearth of competitive bids and overly generous payments to the private partner have been persistent problems (Monteiro, 2005; Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014) .
• While renegotiation costs have eluded quanti cation, the frequency of renegotiations is dismaying: the 35 Portuguese P3s studied by Sarmento and Renneboog (2014) gave birth to 254 contract renegotiations between 1995 and 2012; Chile's widely praised P3 has also su ered from constant renegotiation costs (IMF, 2004) .
Certainly more hard data is needed to justify rm conclusions, especially in the case of LDCs. But the evidence that exists paints a disturbing picture. The verdict in Valila (2005) that "high transaction costs are perhaps the worst, and least studied, drawbacks of PPPs" is entirely fair.
Costs are only one-half of the equation. The other half contains everything the private partner brings to the table: superior technical expertise, greater implementation capacity, and fewer agency problems. These advantages translate into shorter construction periods-important in countries plagued by acute bottlenecks in transport, power, telecommunications, irrigation, etc.-and better, more productive infrastructure. The critical issue is whether the gains in speed and e ciency compensate for the higher cost. In the language favored by government bureaucrats, do P3s o er enough "value for money"? More precisely, do P3s o er better value for money than own investment by the public sector?
Compared to the microeconomic literature with its rich, expansive insights into how asymmetric information, moral hazard, uncertainty, risk allocation, imperfect monitoring, and incomplete contracts a ect the pros and cons of P3s, the macroeconomic literature is almost mute. Its total contribution to the debate consists of the trivial recommendation that future payments to the private partner be explicitly incorporated into the government's scal accounts in order to highlight the point that P3s
defer costs but create a greater overall (i.e., present value) scal burden than traditional procurement.
Echoing the latter concern, the IMF (2007) has called for full integration of P3s into debt sustainability analysis.
This paper gives macroeconomics a greater voice in the conversation about how P3s compare with own investment (OI) by the public sector. We investigate the macroeconomic repercussions of P3
vs. OI in a dynamic general equilibrium macromodel featuring private capital accumulation and a exible speci cation of the labor market that nests the cases of full employment with exible wages and involuntary unemployment with e ciency wages. 4 The unifying theme in our welfare results is that general equilibrium e ects shift the comparison in favor of P3. The direct return in the investment program equals the return on infrastructure minus either the return paid to the private partner (a foreign rm) or the interest rate paid on external debt. In partial equilibrium, the direct return picks the winner. In general equilibrium, the welfare calculation is more complicated. Because P3 builds better, higher quality infrastructure than OI, it crowds in private investment more and increases labor demand more. This helps P3 in the welfare comparison when (i) the private time preference rate exceeds the social time preference rate (implying that private investment is suboptimal at the initial equilibrium); (ii) real wage rigidity prevents full employment; or (iii) wage income carries a larger weight in the social welfare function than income of the representative agent. We show speci cally that the asymmetric impact on macro externalities raises the social return in the P3 2 9 percentage points relative to the social return to OI, depending on whether the externalities operate singly or in combination and on whether P3 enjoys an advantage in speed of construction. The ranking of direct returns is not therefore a reliable proxy for the welfare ranking: a P3 that pays a direct return of 2% may be preferable to OI that pays a direct return of 10%.
Macroeconomic e ects also strongly condition the impact on the scal budget and the prospects for debt sustainability. P3s are considerably more expensive than OI. But their stronger positive e ects on the supply of infrastructure services, private capital accumulation, and employment also generate more revenue from taxes and user fees. This can reduce the need for supporting scal adjustment to the point where debt sustainability is easier to achieve for P3 despite its higher cost. In some cases, P3 requires less scal support than OI at every point in time.
The rest of the paper is organized into six sections. Sections 2 and 3 present the model and solve for the transition path and the steady-state equilibrium. Following this, Sections 4 -6 compare the e ects of P3 and OI on welfare and scal sustainability. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of priorities for future research.
The Model
The model has three components: a government that builds new infrastructure on its own or by partnering with a foreign rm; the domestic private sector, run by a representative agent who pays e ciency wages and accumulates capital; and the national budget constraint, which requires that capital ows nance the current account de cit each period.
The Choice: P3 or OI?
Cobb-Douglas production functions convert infrastructure , capital , and labor into output : 5
with 1 for P3 and
for OI. Infrastructure enters the production function as a shift factor, while e ective labor input depends on the amount of e ort e that workers expend. The service ow from the infrastructure project is ( ), with 1 measuring the gain in e ciency when is built by the private partner instead of the government. is the initial stock level of infrastructure For simplicity, we assume the P3 contract is structured like an annuity. The foreign partner receives ( + )( ) in perpetuity, where ( ) covers depreciation costs and is the return earned on the investment. 6 The government levies a tax on consumption and a user fee on infrastructure services. In the main variant of the model, lump-sum taxes adjust to satisfy the government budget 5 For simplicity in the exposition we omit the time subscript " " 6 The P3s in Mexico's PIDIREGAS scheme are structured as annuities (PIDIREGAS is the spanish acronym for "longterm productive infrastructure projects with deferred impact on the recording of infrastructure.") Typically, however, the government buys out the private partner at some future date, say 1. In this case, di erent dynamic systems operate during (0 1 ) and ( 1 ). The economy follows a nonconvergent path until time 1 ; it then moves on to the convergent saddle path that converges to the new steady state. (Boundary conditions at 1 link the two systems.) This greatly complicates the algebra. The annuity speci cation conveys the key insights while keeping the model analytically tractable. constraint:
for P3.
The alternative to P3 is OI. In this case, the investment is nanced by borrowing in the world capital market at the interest rate . Analogous to the annuity-type P3 contract, the government rolls over the debt forever. The counterpart of (2) is 7
for OI.
Finally, P3 and OI di er in the speed of construction. The private partner not only builds a better road, it builds the road faster-a big selling point in countries su ering from large infrastructure de cits (Monteiro, 2005; Sarmento, 2010) . To capture this, we specify di erent paths for investment . The law of motion for the stock of infrastructure is 
The original budget constraint reads + = + . Since = = , this simpli es to = + = ( ) + ( ) assuming = 0. 8 Faster growth of may re ect either the superior implementation capacity of the private partner or expansion of the investment program when P3 supplements OI for a credit-constrained government. 9 We represent the time derivative of investment in infrastructure by
The Private Sector
The representative agent chooses consumption and e ort to maximize
subject to
with 1 and where 0 , 1 , and 2 are constants; labor supply is xed at unity; = 1 is the unemployment rate; and , , and denote the real wage, the pure time preference rate, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Following standard practice in the e ciency wage literature (e.g., Collard and de la Croix, 2000; Kurmann, 2004, 2010) , we assume that gratitude for having a job and the net utility loss from e ort depends on how well the job pays and on whether jobs are easy or hard to come by (as determined by ).
On an optimal path,
and
Equation (7) is the standard Euler equation for consumption, while equation (8) says that employees work harder when they are paid more or feel threatened by a high unemployment rate.
Firms recognize the connection between labor productivity ( ) and the real wage ( ). Hence they optimize over and . The pro t-maximizing choices satisfy, as usual, =
and e e = 1 (10) Equation (8) and the Solow condition in (10) imply, conveniently, that e ort is constant in general equilibrium: 10
10 Per the Solow condition, the optimal wage minimizes the cost of labor in e ciency units [i.e., = arg min e( )].
We set 1 = 1 (without loss of generality), so the wage curve de ned by (8) and (11) reads
Unlike in Phillips Curve models, there is no natural rate of unemployment, just a curve relating the equilibrium wage to the unemployment rate.
The National Budget Constraint
The model is closed by the national budget constraint. Substituting for in equation (6) produces 11
for P3 and
for IO. Across the development spectrum, wage and employment data exhibit the same patterns: (i) rmsize wage premiums that start at very small establishment size (5+ employees) and are much larger than in developed countries; (ii) persistent, remarkably stable inter-industry wage di erentials; (iii) high correlation of industry wage premiums across occupations; (iv) large wage premia for formal vs. informal sector employment and for informal non-agricultural employment vs. agricultural employ-11 Capital in ows and new infrastructure investment cancel out. In the case of OI, for example, = , which simpli es to (13 0 ) after noting that = and = .
The Case for E ciency Wages
ment; and (v) large cyclical ows into and out of unemployment in both the formal sector and the informal sector. At present, only e ciency wage models can explain all of these stylized facts. We do not have the space here to survey the literature in greater depth or to discuss myrial estimation issues. References and capsule summaries of the results for 47 studies are available, however, at http://mypage.iu.edu/~ebu e/.
None of this denies the potential relevance of models that postulate full employment or alternative theories of wage rigidity. There is tremendous diversity in the structure of labor markets across and within LDCs. The right model depends therefore on the country and the type of infrastructure project under investigation. In South Africa, where the national unemployment rate (really) is 25%, trade unions are strong, and minimum wage laws are enforced in all regions, all industries, and at rms of all size, equation (12) with 2 very small is probably a good t. 12 In the most common case, high unemployment rates are con ned to urban areas (see Table 1 ). The appropriate model then depends on the location of the project. If the project increases the supply of power to a major urban center,
The Long-Run Solution
Suppose policy makers opt for P3. At the new steady state,
Equations (9), (12), (14), and (15) can be solved for , , , and as a function of . Straightforward algebra delivers
where
and = is the return on infrastructure (net of depreciation). (18) and (19).
Since and are gross complements in production, the kk and LL schedules slope upward: growth in employment increases the equilibrium capital stock and vice versa. 15 An increase in the supply of infrastructure acts like a positive productivity shock, shifting kk vertically upward and LL horizontally to the right. In the long run,
15 LL is steeper in slope than kk:
The corresponding solutions for OI substitute the return for . Thus
These solutions underpin many of the results in the paper. Two points merit emphasis. First, the positive direct e ects on capital accumulation and employment depend on the return on infrastructure.
Given the consensus view that exceeds , this strengthens the case for P3. Second, feedback e ects between changes in the capital stock and employment greatly magnify the direct e ects. Empirical estimates of 2 cluster between 0 5 and 1 5. For values of 2 in this range, the feedback multiplier is on the order of 1 5 3 for and 2 4 for . Point D in Figure 1 is far north of point B and far east of point C.
Return now to equation (16). Because the multiplier e ects on capital accumulation and employment are so large, partial and general equilibrium analysis often reach di erent conclusions about whether P3 or OI pays the highest return. Substituting the solutions for and into (16) gives
The solution for OI replaces and with and :
Therefore ¯P
In the case of full employment ( 2 ), becomes ( + )(1 ) and consequently
Figure 2 plots the solutions in equations (26) The income share of capital, the depreciation rate, and the external borrowing rate take ordinary values. 16 For the private time preference rate, we chose the highish value 10% based on the estimates in Isham and Kaufmann (1999) and Dalgaard and Hansen (2005) of the return to private capital in LDCs. Estimates of the return on infrastructure in LDCs are all over the map, but the weight of the evidence in both micro and macro studies points to high average returns of 15 30%-see Bu e et al. (2012) . Accordingly, we set the return at 16% for OI and 16 25% for P3. Finally, is a pricey 15% because it re ects all of the costs associated with P3. In addition to the return paid to the private partner-many points above for reasons discussed in the introduction-it includes annuitized payments for the very high transaction costs incurred in P3s. 17 Unfortunately, the paucity of data on transaction costs and actual payments to the private partner means there is a lot of uncertainty about the right value for . Our choice of 15% is a crude, semi-educated guess. It is also, we admit, a debating tactic. Since tops out at 25%, the DRG ranges from zero to -9%. The case for P3 rests entirely therefore with general equilibrium e ects; by assumption, OI enjoys a big advantage in the comparison of direct returns. Table 2 con rms that general equilibrium e ects are potent, especially when increases in employment reinforce the gains from capital accumulation. In the column at the far right, where = 25
and both direct returns equal 10%, the consumption return for P3 is 16 25% above the return for OI with full employment and 31 39% higher when involuntary unemployment exists. Alternatively, 16 Borrowing at 6% is in line with real interest rate paid by LICs in recent Eurobond issues and with the data presented in Gueye and Sy (2010) .
17 Some transaction costs do not result in higher payments to the private partner. The impact on the scal budget and national income is the same, however, if the transaction costs use up real resources.
consider the breakeven points in Figure 2 . The schedule for full employment breaks into the rst quadrant at¯ = 222. This is neither exciting nor insigni cant. But when infrastructure investment reduces unemployment,¯ drops to 179 196. Strikingly, in ve of nine runs where P3 pays a direct return of only 4%, it increases real income more than OI. Although these are not welfare results, they foreshadow the conclusion that P3 may dominate OI even when the DRG is very large.
The Transition Path
The transition path is governed by equations (3), (4), (7), and (13), along with equation (18), which links the path of employment to the paths of the capital stock and the stock of infrastructure.
Linearizing (7) and (13) 
Substitute for from (18) and note that the second derivatives of the production function satisfy
After collecting terms,
and Until Section 4.3, we ignore di erences in implementation and the speed of construction. In-frastructure investment is constant at¯ and
for both P3 and OI.
Equations (30)- (32) form a self-contained system of three di erential equations in , , and :
The stationary equilibrium is a saddle point with two state variables, and , and two negative eigenvalues:
The Welfare Criterion
We measure social welfare as 18
SW allows the benevolent social planner to set below the private time preference rate . Should (s)he?
The position of policy makers is clear. In both developed and less developed countries, the social time preference rate used to calculate the cost-bene t ratio for public sector projects is usually much lower than the private rate. HM Treasury (2003) recommends, for example, = 2 3 5%.
Theory cannot tell us whether 3% is a sensible number for , the view of HM Treasury notwithstanding. It does, however, provide cogent arguments for . In Sen's (1967) isolation paradox, private saving is suboptimal because individuals would be willing to enter into a social contract that required everyone to save more. Feldstein (1964) and Baumol (1965) reach the same conclusion more quickly by appealing to the notion that economic development is partly a public good; if the premise is granted, then the social time preference rate "must be administratively determined as a matter of public policy [because] the market cannot express the 'collective' demand for investment to bene t 18 The e ort component in the private agent's utility function always equals zero in general equilibrium.
the future" (Feldstein, 1964, pp. 362, 365) .
Welfare Comparisons
All of the machinery is now in place to rank the welfare gains for P3 vs. OI. We start with the simplest case.
Full Employment
We derive the solutions for and in Appendix A. The welfare gain, measured in units of consumption, is
for P3, where and Similarly,
for OI. It can be shown with some e ort that the terms involving ( ) in and are positive (see Appendix A).
The welfare solutions look forbidding, but they have the expected form and agree with intuition. When = , then = = 0 In this case, the impact on private capital accumulation is irrelevant.
The welfare gain is simply the capitalized value of the stream of returns generated by increases in the supply of infrastructure: 19
Discounting at changes the welfare calculation in two ways. First, the lower discount rate increases the present value welfare gain from increases in the stock of infrastructure. Second, since the private capital stock is below its socially optimal level, crowding in private investment generates an additional welfare gain. The impact of this gain on the welfare comparison depends on vs. as the increase in the service ow determines the stimulus to private investment. Thus P3 may increase welfare more than OI despite a lower direct return. From (35) and (35 0 ),
The term on the left side (LHS) of (37) 
Unemployment
There is no need to repeat the algebraic derivations in the previous section. Obviously, the term multiplying in equation (37) is much larger and the case for P3 much stronger when infrastructure investment reduces unemployment. P3 produces an additional welfare gain of 27 34%
in the runs where direct returns are equal ( = 25 in Table 4 ), and the breakeven value of 19 Note here that = (1 e )(¯ ).
decreases to 17 22 (Figure 3 ). Policy makers can rest assured that P3 is the right choice when the DRG is three points or less. In economies with highly rigid wages ( 2 = 1 5), it may be the right choice even when the direct return is 7 8 points lower than for OI.
The Importance of Speed
When P3 builds infrastructure faster than OI, enters the core dynamic system as a state variable.
The new system is 
When the government invests on its own, = 1 and traverses 50% of ground to its new steady-state level in 1 = ln( 50) years. In the comparison run for P3, we set = 20 and chose so that reaches the 50% benchmark in 25% less time. 21 Figure 4 shows the two paths for . In an in nite horizon model where the choice between P3 and OI is repeated in a sequence of projects, the gap between the paths widens for 15 years before starting to shrink.
Infrastructure de cits are large in low-income countries (LICs), middle-income countries (MICs) and most emerging economies (EMEs). Consequently, speed matters. It matters a lot in the fullemployment economy, the case least favorable to P3. It matters even more in countries with unemployed workers because shorter construction periods for infrastructure increase labor demand directly ( 0)and via faster growth in the private capital stock. Time is money, as they say in the business world.
The numbers in Tables 5 and 6 are surprising, nevertheless. Compare these tables with Tables 3   and 4 . When direct returns are equal, the welfare-gain-advantage of P3 soars from 0 34% in Tables   20 The solution 
The Fiscal Challenge
Lump-sum taxes adjust to pay the private partner in P3 and foreign bond holders in OI. Since
, it seems obvious that the scal challenge is greater for P3 than for OI. This is not necessarily the case, however. P3s are much more expensive than OI, but they also increase the supply of infrastructure services and real output more than OI, generating more revenue at existing tax rates.
Let denote net national income-e.g., = ( ) ( + ) for P3-and de ne¯ ( + ), the ratio of the user fee to the monetary value of infrastructure services produced by OI. Solving the government budget constraints (2) and (2 0 ) for then gives
where ¯ + (1 ) 1 0 and
When the speed of construction is the same for P3 and OI,
The existing literature worries, rightly, that the rst term is positive and large. But the di erence in endogenous revenue-the sum of the last three terms-carries the opposite sign and is also potentially large.
We track
, the ratio of the increase in to to the increase in infrastructure investment measured as a percentage of National Net Income (NNI). Translating into plain English, is the "coe cient of scal stress."
( 1 ) = 75 means, for example, that the government has to collect an additional 75% of NNI in lump-sum taxes at time 1 to nance a permanent increase in infrastructure investment equal to 1% of NNI. Figure 5 shows the path of for a variety of cases in which = 10 15 and P3 ties or wins the welfare comparison. 23 The diversity of outcomes is extreme. 24 Sometimes the P3 line is always above the OI line, sometimes it is always below; sometimes the two lines cross; sometimes the lines stay in the rst quadrant, sometimes they end up in the fourth quadrant. Clearly, there is no general presumption that P3 creates more scal stress than OI. Much depends on the productivity di erential ( ), the structure of taxes, and the labor market:
• When = 20, = 10, (i.e., the = 0) and user fees cover only depreciation costs (¯ = 25), the gap between the P3 and OI lines is positive and large for several decades (Figures 5a   and 5e ). But the gap shrinks considerably when = 25, and in the model with unemployment the sign changes to the advantage of P3 at year 13 (Figures 5b and 5f ).
• Because P3 builds better, more productive infrastructure than OI, modest user fees that cover O+M costs plus 30 50% of interest/return payments make a big di erence to the scal outcome.
In the runs where = 25, = 10, and¯ = 40, P3 pays for itself immediately or within a few years (Figures 5d and 5g ) and delivers a much larger scal dividend than OI. The comparison still favors OI when = 20 (Figures 5c and 5h ), but the choice in Figure 5h is between good and better-scal adjustment is easy and stress-free for both P3 and OI. 23 We are interested in whether the scal challenge is greater for P3 when it maximizes welfare. In a wide search of the relevant parameter space, we did not come across any cases where OI maximized welfare but P3 minimized scal stress. 24 decreases a small amount at = 0 because consumption rises in anticipation of an increase in future income.
The import of these results is that policy makers should not pre-judge how scal concerns a ect the case for P3 vs. OI. P3 wins the welfare comparison decisively when = 25 or when = 20 and involuntary unemployment exists. In half of the runs, it is also the choice that minimizes scal stress, provided a little help is available from user fees. Indeed, Figure 5 suggests that welfare-maximizing P3s may ease scal constraints and improve the prospects for debt sustainability. The Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of Public Works should agree as often as not.
Extensions
The benchmark model assumes that lump-sum taxes adjust in the government budget constraint and that social welfare depends solely on consumption of the representative agent. We relax both assumptions below. The rst proves innocuous, but the second is potentially important.
Distortionary Taxes Adjust
Distortionary taxes may bear part or all of the cost of nancing public investment. To investigate this scenario, treat as a CES aggregate of two consumer goods and assume that only 2 is subject to the tax . The exact consumer price index is
is the world market price of good ; is a CES distribution parameter; and is the elasticity of substitution between 1 and 2 . We choose units so that 1 = 1 and 2 = 1 (1 + ). Thus 1 = 2 = = 1 at the initial equilibrium.
The public, private, and national budget constraints are
Demand for good 2 is
and adjusts endogenously in (43) to satisfy the government budget constraint.
E ciency gains/losses from the tax distortion show up in the term 2 2 in the national budget constraint. Digging into the details, linearize equation (45) and solve (43) and (46) , the consumption share of good 2.
Consistent with the results in Section 5, the impact on the scal budget and the consumption tax can go either way. Regardless of whether rises or falls, however, the welfare e ects are merely "little triangles." Consider the solution for steady-state consumption. From (47)- (49), and the solution for in (20),
The term + ¯ ( + ) picks up the direct e ect on the budget-see (49). It is negative for plausible values of , , and¯ . But since is small at high levels of aggregation-a universal nding in estimates of demand systems with 5-10 goods-the coe cient on the direct e ect, (1 ) 0 , is extremely small. Moreover, the small negative term in the numerator is counterbalanced by a multiplier slightly larger than unity (re ecting the gain from increases in that translate into increases in 2 ). Consumption may increase more or less than in the case where lump-sum taxes adjust, but the di erence is pocket change. And the impact on the P3-OI ranking, which depends on the size di erence in two little triangles, is even smaller. The solution for OI substitutes and for and in (50). Hence 
Barring an exceptionally large productivity gap, ( At the risk of beating a dead horse, we went to the trouble of deriving the transition path (see Appendix C) and computing exact welfare comparisons for lump-sum vs. distortionary tax adjustment.
Unsurprisingly, the numbers in Table 7 are always very close. In many cases, the di erence amounts to rounding error.
Incorporating Distributional Concerns
Policy makers obsess about creating more and better-paying jobs. Short of building a model with heterogeneous agents, the most natural way to incorporate the gains from more/better jobs is to enter real wage income in the social welfare function. In this section,
In principle, f is the answer to the problem: when real wage income decreases by one dollar, social welfare is unchanged if aggregate consumption increases by dollars. Although policy makers will not reveal their answer, Benthamite utilitarian calculations shed some light on reasonable values for f. In out model, a utilitarian welfare function implies f = 47 2 05 when = 35 1 and other parameters take their usual values. 25 Our earlier results predict the qualitative and quantitative changes in the welfare arithmetic reported in Tables 8 and 9 . Naturally, since P3 increases labor demand real wages more than OI, it bene ts much more from the distributional externality. For = 06 and values of f that we consider (too) conservative ( 5) or reasonable (1 1 5), the breakeven value of drops from 202 to 169 185 in the runs with e ciency wages and from 239 to 189 214 for projects in regions with full employment. Distributional concerns increase the social return for both P3 and OI, but the gain for P3 is much larger, especially in the full-employment case.
Concluding Remarks
There is a clean division of labor between microeconomic and macroeconomic analysis of P3s. The job of microeconomics is to secure the best possible deal for the LDC by structuring the P3 contract so as to maximize the incentives for delivery of high-quality services while minimizing transaction costs for the government and rents paid to the private partner. In the existing literature, the story ends here. The nal step in the evaluation process compares the net return in the optimal P3 contract, calculated as simply the return on infrastructure net of total costs for the government, to the net return on OI by the public sector. 25 Suppose there are 1 capitalists and workers. The Benthamite social welfare function is = (1 ) 1 1
( 1 1 But the partial equilibrium comparison of net returns should not be the nal step. In a world that is irredeemably second-best, general equilibrium macroeconomic analysis is required for an accurate comparison of social returns to P3 and OI. Typically P3s cost more but produce higher-quality infrastructure and boast a better on-time completion record than OI. Because they score better on eciency and speed, P3s are comparatively more e ective in reducing underinvestment in private capital, underinvestment in infrastructure, unemployment and poverty. How much should policy makers be willing to pay for these bene ts? Our two-word answer is "a lot." The welfare gains from ameliorating major macroeconomic externalities raise the social return in P3 by 5 8 percentage points relative to the return on OI.
The current paper is part of a larger project the IMF has initiated to improve the analysis of P3s in
LDCs. Future research in the project will focus on construction of policy tools that are theory-based but exible and user-friendly. We plan speci cally to integrate P3s into the DIG (Debt, Investment, and Growth) model developed by Bu e et al. (2012) . The P3-DIG model promises to cover all the bases: policy makers will be able to specify the exact terms in annuity or DBOT (design, build, operate, and transfer) contracts, to rank the welfare gains for P3 vs. OI, and to track the paths of key macroeconomic variables (sectoral wages, employment, and output, private investment, the real exchange rate, external debt and the current account de cit, etc.). A Appendix A To show that 0 and 0, note rst that 2 + and are opposite in sign. Hence
is su cient for 1 + 
But we already know that 2 + and take the same sign. Thus the condition in (A5) holds.
The solution for OI takes the same form as (A3), with and replacing and .
B Appendix B
When P3 builds infrastructure faster than OI, the core dynamic system is (48) and (49) 
